

Gallipoli or Other Peoples' Wars Revisited: Sundry Reflections on ANZAC: a Review Article

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What is wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History. By Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds with Mark McKenna and Joy Damousi (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010), pp.192, AU\$29.95 pb.

1918, Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of History. Edited by Ashley Ekins (Auckland: Exisle, 2010); pp.328, AU\$49.99 hb.

Gallipoli: A Short History. By Michael McKernan (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2010), pp.232, AU\$47.95 pb.

Gallipoli Revisited. In the forgotten Footsteps of Charles Bean and the Australian Historical Mission. By Janda Gooding (Canberra: Hardie Grant and Australian War Memorial, 2009), pp. 256 + illustrations, AU\$59.95 hb.

When one reads that the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps “invaded” Turkey on 25 April 1915 at the behest of the British one wonders really about the writer’s ability to reach a balanced historical judgment. Some seem to forget a number of crucial facts that would need to be taken into account such as that the Dardanelles campaign was a joint operation planned by the British and French for the purpose of establishing a line of communication with their beleaguered Russian ally who was being invaded in Eastern Europe by Prusso-Germany. The latter power was out to do two things, namely first to establish hegemony over mainland Europe and secondly to destroy the British Empire. To accomplish this the Prusso-German power-elite, a reactionary militaristic, anti-democratic aristocracy, had cultivated its dream of *Mitteuropa*, meaning German domination of central Europe stretching from a conquered and despoiled France and an occupied Belgium in the West to the Urals in the East where Russia was to be reduced to resemble an insignificant Persia. Austria-Hungary was to assist in this gigantic endeavour as junior partner.¹ Over the former

* Of central relevance to this theme is Anthony Cooper, “‘Groveling’ or *Realpolitik*: The Struggle within Australian Historiography to Interpret the First World War” in John A. Moses and Christopher Pugsley, eds, *The German Empire and Britain’s Pacific Dominions 1871-1919: Essays on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism* (Claremont, CA, 2000), pp.507-528.

¹ Bernd F. Schulte, *Deutsche “Policy of Pretention”: Der Abstieg eines Kriegerstaates 1871-1914* [The Decline of a Warrior State] (Hamburg, 2009), pp.287-92. Schulte here discusses the intentions of the German power elite as expressed in a letter from one *Kapitän zur See* Wilhelm Widenmann to

Russian-dominated territories German princes were installed after the implementation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in early 1918 having been allocated the thrones of newly created kingdoms to govern as part of an extended German empire ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea.² Prusso-Germany would thus have control of Europe for “imaginable time” as it was stated in the celebrated “September Program”. This remarkable document was discovered in the archives housed in Potsdam after the Second World War by Imanuel Geiss and made available to the Hamburg professor, Fritz Fischer. The latter scholar re-wrote the history of German war aims, 1914-18, in his two massive publications that unleashed an indignant outcry from most of his conservative German colleagues.³ Hitherto, German historians had preferred to believe, in opposition to the charge of “sole war guilt” (paragraph 231 in the Treaty of Versailles), that all of the belligerent Powers on both sides in 1914 shared equally in the responsibility for the conflict. This thesis could no longer be sustained in the light of new evidence to the contrary. Indeed, there was to be a massive extension of German power in continental Europe and Africa (the *Mittelfrika* project). To accomplish all this, the Germans also planned the destruction of what they called *England* by which term at the time they meant the entire British Empire. The mastermind for this aspect of German war-aims was none other than the Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930) who early devised the plan to out-build The Royal Navy in battleships with a view to its ultimate destruction.⁴ This objective came dramatically near to success in the famous Battle of Jutland, 31 May to 1 June 1916.

Thirdly, the Germans had further wide-ranging ambitions in the Balkans and the Near East, known under the heading of the Berlin-Baghdad railway project. This was a favourite objective of the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, himself, who had made two extensive tours of the Ottoman Empire, first in 1889 and then in 1898 in order to cultivate the Turks, but the long-term aim was to establish the rail link to Persia as a means of establishing German influence in the region. The ultimate goal was to drive the British out of India.⁵ Consequently, the by now shaky Ottoman empire (the Sick Man of Europe) was encouraged with generous donations of Krupp-produced heavy weaponry

Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, 29 August 1914. The goals of a massive extension of German power in central Europe as well as the destruction of the Royal Navy animated by a pathological hatred of *England* are candidly spelled out. Schulte's work documents the long-term Prusso-German will to imperialistic expansion at the cost of all neighbouring states. He confirms thereby the “rogue” nature of Wilhelmine Germany, in short her *Sonderweg*, meaning her separate path to modernity in contrast to the West. See Wouter Werner, “From Justus Hosti to Rogue State”, *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*, Vol. 17, 2 (2004), p.165, where it is observed that “Wilhelmine Germany is another predecessor of today's Iran and North Korea. The Kaiserreich's submarine warfare made it a pariah state of the time.”

² See John Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace* (London, 1963).

³ Fritz Fischer's works referred to here are: 1) *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf, 1961), English: *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London, 1969) and *Krieg der Illusionen* (Düsseldorf, 1969), English: *War of Illusions* (London, 1974). See my early analysis of the debate these books unleashed among German scholars, publicists and politicians entitled, *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography* (St Lucia, 1975).

⁴ On the so-called Tirpitz Plan, see Volker R. Berghahn, *Der Tirpitz Plan* (Düsseldorf, 1971) and his later English-language study, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York, 1993). The latest detailed study is by Patrick J. Kelly, *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy* (Bloomington IN, 2011).

⁵ David Stafford, “A Moral Tale: Anglo-German Relations, 1860-1914”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 4, 2 (May 1982), pp.249-63, and Thomas G. Fraser, “Germany and the Indian Revolution, 1914-1918”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 12 (1977), pp.255-7.

as well as the assignment of top-level German military advisers.⁶ Expansionist will under Kaiser Wilhelm II knew no bounds. As Fritz Fischer and others have subsequently documented, this will was sustained virtually unmodified until the end of 1918 when finally the German Hindenburg Line in the West was broken in August of that year, an action in which Anzacs played a decisive role. The determination of the Allies to press home their advantage finally forced the Germans to sue for an armistice on 11 November 1918. Thus the Prusso-German power elite was denied its great objectives, and during the interlude of the post-revolutionary Weimar Republic, 1919-1933, had to accept defeat as documented in the Treaty of Versailles. Significantly, this same power-elite enrolled the Hitler movement to revive their frustrated war-aims, thus heralding the overthrow of the democratic Weimar constitution and the advent of the Nazi Third Reich leading to the outbreak of yet another world war.⁷ So much for the “continuity” of German history.⁸

It is, therefore, plainly untrue that Australia had no stake in the First World War. All the Dominions, in fact, with the possible exception of Canada, could be attacked by German naval forces, and doubtless would have been had not, firstly, the German East Asia Squadron been driven off late in 1914, and secondly the German High Seas Fleet been dealt a major blow at Jutland even though it had succeeded in sinking more tonnage than they themselves sustained. The fact was that British naval power could not be eliminated as von Tirpitz had planned. The Royal Navy still had sufficient capital ships to enable Britain to sustain her mastery of the seas. The remnant of the High Seas Fleet never ventured out of port again. The Germans simply lacked the necessary reserves. Thereafter the Kaiser’s war planners placed all their hopes in unrestricted U-boat warfare which also turned out to be a massive strategic blunder because it was precisely that which brought the Americans into the war thus effectively putting paid in the long term to both the *Mitteleuropa* project as well as all other ambitions overseas. As Fritz Fischer and others since have irrefutably demonstrated, the German bid for world power was based on the delusion that Teutons were racially superior to the decadent Anglo-Saxons, the effete French and the barbarous Russians. As well they cultivated an ideology that affirmed that God had called the Germans to execute His divine will for the world: *Gott mit uns* and *Gott strafe England* (may God punish England). Imperial Germany perceived herself in her day as destined also by the laws of history (*Historismus*) to displace the moribund British Empire as well as the other powers and to impose Germandom or Pan-Germanism on the world at their expense. This was ideologically underpinned by Neo-Rankeanism spearheaded at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the leading historians at Germany’s elite universities. They re-functioned the influential teachings of the renowned Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) that states, being “ideas of God” were locked in an eternal

⁶ Most recently examined and explained by the Turkish-based American scholar, Sean McMeekin, *Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power* (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

⁷ For a succinct account of the continuity of German military ambitions from 1914 to 1945, see Fritz Fischer, *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History*, trans. Roger Fletcher (London, 1986).

⁸ Note should be taken of the considerable research done on German naval policy in the Pacific by Peter Overlack, “The Imperial German Navy in the Pacific, 1900-1914 as an Instrument of *Weltpolitik* with special Reference to Australian operational Planning” (PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 1995) as well as his web-site for an extensive list of research articles on this subject. See also Jürgen Tampke, ed., *Ruthless Warfare: German Military Planning and Surveillance in the Australia – New Zealand Region before the Great War: Documents* (Canberra, 1998).

struggle for hegemony. The one that emerged triumphant was the one which was the true agent of almighty God. The proximity to Hegel's philosophy of history is not coincidental.

If all this is understood, the argument that the young Commonwealth had no stake in the outcome of the "Great War" would have to be abandoned.⁹ It would have to be acknowledged that the British Empire of which both Australia and New Zealand were loyal members was the guarantor both of national security and thus their democratic political culture. When these were under direct threat from an anti-democratic international bully, there was no choice but to stand up and fight. And it is this self-same recognition that led to the American intervention in 1917 into the great European conflict.¹⁰ If the United States could not stand aside and see such a reactionary Empire as that of the Kaiser subdue Europe and bring Britain to her knees, how much more so did the overseas Dominions need to defend themselves by supporting the mother country both in men and treasure.

Here, expressed as cogently as possible, is the *context* in which Australia and New Zealand found themselves fighting in the Great War. It was simply not possible to create an egalitarian democracy *undisturbed in "splendid isolation"* because Great Power rivalries could not be confined to a European theatre. And the chief reason for that were the delusions of German world policy. As Professor Trevor Wilson made patently clear in his masterly study of British policy, German aggression in July-August 1914 led inexorably to the invasion of Belgium which country the British were treaty-bound to defend.¹¹ Of course, Britain did not *have* to honour this pledge, but the choice was at the time to stand by and effectively do nothing and grant the German militarists *carte blanche* to execute their ominous war plans. Alternatively, you could stand up and fight like men. To cite Professor Wilson: "The conflict was about preserving Britain as a major power, and even as an independent power, and about vindicating its liberal parliamentary system against the challenge of military autocracy".¹² Clearly the objectives of German military planning in 1914 as laid down in the famous *Schlieffen Plan*, namely to knock out France by marching through and crushing neutral Belgium, had to be resisted. The prospect of confronting a German occupation of Europe imposed both moral and *Realpolitik* obligations on the British government. The Australasian Dominions were thus involved from the start, both as direct objects of predatory German naval plans in the Pacific, and as well, indirectly, confronting the possibility of the destruction of British naval power which would have allowed the Germans a free hand to realise their dreams of world domination.

It would seem that the writing of not a few Australian historians and publicists on this subject remains completely "unprejudiced" by any knowledge, understanding or interest in German war-aims. As indicated, if these are taken into account the argument for Australasian neutrality in 1914-18 collapses. It was the unpredictability of the war situation brought about by the German invasion of Belgium, France and Russia, that

⁹ See the contemporary Australian response to the First World War as expressed by Professor A.T. Strong: John A. Moses, "An Australian Empire Patriot and the Great War. Professor Archibald T. Strong (1876-1930)", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 53, 3 (September 2007), pp.407-419.

¹⁰ Joseph Siracusa, "Wilson's Image of the Prussian Menace: Ideology and *Realpolitik*" in Moses and Pugsley, *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions 1871-1919*, pp.53-90.

¹¹ Trevor Wilson, *The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918* (Cambridge, 1986).

¹² *Ibid.*, p.2.

led to the Allies' plan to invade Turkey in April 1915. It was an Anglo-French strategic venture that ended in misadventure of which the Anzac division was tragically a part. Turkey had been a long-time ally of the *Kaiserreich*. To argue that Australia invaded Turkey is one of those formulations by those who choose not to comprehend the "community of fate" in which all the Dominions were bound. This seems to elude, for example, the producers of *What's Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History*. Professor Lake and her associates have every right to argue their case, and they have done so to provoke debate, and in this they have been very successful. Indeed, they claim to have written to "encourage a more critical and truthful (*sic*) public debate about the uses of the Anzac myth". The concentration of some historians and the Department of Veterans' Affairs, on promoting the "Anzac myth" has allegedly "militarized" Australian history.¹³

There are some obvious points to observe here. It is clear that students need to be made aware of the reasons for the colonization by the British of both Australia and New Zealand. Both Australia and New Zealand became struggling British settlements trying to survive against considerable geographical and environmental difficulties. When finally they did become viable, whereby the gold rush era of the 1850's contributed significantly, there inevitably arose a desire to create a more egalitarian society than that which existed in Britain. Consequently, the great themes of social justice and democracy were high priority issues. Obviously, these do need to be part of the national educational agenda. But as various scholars such as Neville Meaney and more recently, David Walker, have pointed out, there was also a dominant concern with security, namely the awareness that the British Pacific colonies were easy prey to any power, European or Asiatic, that wished to dispute British sovereignty.¹⁴ In short, there was an early realisation that one could not develop a modern egalitarian social democracy if the colonies were not adequately defended. This imposed the so-called "primacy of foreign policy" (Eckart Kehr) already in the nineteenth century. British Australasia was not a quarantined zone. Responsible politicians always realized this and so inevitably a balance had to be struck between pursuing the goal of establishing a "working man's paradise" on the one hand and the maintenance of national security on the other. It would seem that those historians who disparage the British imperial connection have been mesmerized by the apparent isolation of Australia and New Zealand. The age of the battle cruiser had already dawned and one needed to draw the logical consequences.

The project mounted by Lake, Reynolds *et al.* assumes that that the Pacific Dominions had a choice in 1914 to remain aloof from the "great European war" but were duped by Whitehall into involvement in a catastrophic conflict that really did not concern them. That being the case, the annual commemoration of the 60,000 fallen, namely Anzac Day, really celebrates a discredited imperial subordination and should be abandoned. As indicated, such a recommendation emerges from a flawed comprehension of the precise nature of the conflict initiated by Prusso-Germany in July-August 1914. As well, every Power that participated in that war solemnly

¹³ *What's Wrong with Anzac?*, p.viii. Attacked here is an alleged pre-disposition to ignore the long history of an anti-war tradition in Australia and the neglect by some historians of the national civil and political traditions of democratic equality and social justice.

¹⁴ Neville Meaney, *A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy: The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914*, Vol 1, and *Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923*, Vol 2 (Sydney, 2009). These volumes are up-dated versions of Meaney's earlier work published already in 1976. David Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1880-1939* (St Lucia, 1999).

memorialises their fallen in ways appropriate to their national culture. Australia and New Zealand are no different. Further, the world has not become a safer place. While there are unstable expansionist states there is always the need to maintain vigilance and to be prepared to act in peace-keeping missions. An isolationist, inward-looking and pacifist stance are not really things that recommend themselves to most Australians or the major political parties. Consequently, it is very difficult to see why there is such a complaint about "Anzac" and why a long established tradition of mourning should be coldly jettisoned. Australian history has not been "militarized"; the nation only does what many other nations do once a year to honour their war dead.

A timely corrective to anti-Anzac views already exists in the volume *1918, Year of Victory: the End of the Great War and the Shaping of History*. The chapters are the revised papers presented at a conference at the Australian War Memorial in November 2008. The contribution of all Allied states to the ultimate defeat of Germany is evaluated by authors who have distilled the essence of the very latest research. Such a comparative collection is a boon to all teachers of modern history of which the Great War was the "seminal event" (George Kennan). What the collection brings sharply into focus is the overwhelming necessity of opposing Prusso-German militarism. The tragedy was that the Allies' resolve to enforce the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles weakened and so they unwittingly allowed the Nazis to capture the hearts and minds of most Germans who had become prey to the "stab-in-the-back" propaganda, as well as the anti-Semitic and anti-Western propaganda of the Hitler movement.¹⁵ But where this collection is relevant to the Anzac contribution is that it highlights the all important need of the British Empire and its Allies to eliminate the world-wide menace of "Prussianism". This may not be forgotten, and the authors of the various papers here do well to remind the Australian readership of the danger then facing the young Commonwealth. In particular, English historian Stephen Badsey points out that:

The practical examples of the 1914 September Program [see above] for the domination of Western Europe, and the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the domination of the East, together with the ideology and rhetoric of Wilhelmine Germany, now leave little doubt that the Kaiser's European Union would have been a war-like, expansionist and authoritarian state. There is also nothing to suggest that in 1914-18 Germany would have settled for any peace other than the complete defeat of its major enemies.¹⁶

And that, of course, included the Pacific Dominions. There is no doubt that at the very least peace conditions would have been imposed that would have left both Australia and New Zealand as virtual dependencies of an aggrandized Germany.¹⁷ *1918, Year of Victory* is a historiographical benchmark that serves to put into true perspective the real significance of the Great War.

Michael McKernan, *Gallipoli: A Short History*, does not attempt to analyse whether the Commonwealth government made the "right" decision to make troops available to fight at the behest of the British. He does, however, investigate the planning of the operation and he exposes the bungling of its execution under British command and in particular explains why the operation was not broken off when it was considered virtually unwinnable by the commanders in the field. Instead, the order came from London to keep fighting. McKernan writes perceptively about all this but does not

¹⁵ Trevor Wilson, "The Peace Settlement of 1919" in Ekins, ed., *1918, Year of Victory*, pp.217-25.

¹⁶ Stephen Badsey, "Ninety Years On" in Ekins, ed., *1918, Year of Victory*, p.255.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Bolton, "Federated Australia: Republic of the South Seas or New Britannia?" in Moses and Pugsley, *The German Empire and Britian's Paific Dominions*, pp.141-54.

venture into the blame game beyond pointing out that all the Allied forces involved, not just the Anzacs, were needlessly wasted in a military situation from which extrication became enormously complicated. "Cut and run" had, however finally to be accepted. What McKernan presents is an account of a useless tragedy seen through the eyes of selected Diggers whose records, both official and family, enable a sensitive reconstruction of the pathos of the situation. This is very good history written from the participant's angle. War is a hellish business, and it is salutary to be reminded of it. Soldiers are tragically and inevitably expendable. And while they are being expended they do not always see the point of the exercise as devised by the "brass". But there is no overtly pacifist message here. McKernan is a far too experienced historian to embrace and advance contested ideologies. That said, an attempt to portray the *context* of international relations at the time would have enhanced the value of the book. Here was an opportunity to take into account what historians such as Trevor Wilson and Geoffrey Bolton have shown, namely that German war aims were ultimately responsible for the conflict in the first place. As well, some reference to German pre-war expansionism in the Balkans and the Near East would have been desirable, not to mention German imperial policy in the Pacific. But these were not McKernan's concerns. His objective has been to portray the experience of enlisted men in a place which McKernan has personally traversed in order to gain first hand an impression of the conditions under which the Anzacs fought. Our imagination is thereby challenged to try to re-experience mentally the horror of the experience. And here is why Janda Gooding's handsome pictorial volume, *Gallipoli Revisited: In the Footsteps of Charles Bean and the Australian Historical Mission* serves to bring home to later generations the magnitude and humanly daunting nature of the conflict. It was fought, at least in the Dardanelles, over the most inhospitable terrain, every bit as hostile to human beings as for example the Kokoda trail in the Owen Stanley ranges of Papua New Guinea was in 1942.

Janda Gooding, who is head of the Photographs, Film and Sound section of the Australian War Memorial, has produced a pictorial record with detailed explanation of the theatres of conflict in the Dardanelles from the Anzac and Turkish standpoints. This handsomely produced volume resembles in format a coffee table book, but it is far more than that; it reproduces the photographs as well some of the paintings of the famous George Lambert. Gooding's work builds on Charles Bean's book, *Gallipoli Mission* first published in 1948,¹⁸ and constitutes a fuller pictorial augmentation of Bean's original account of the work of the Australian Historical Mission dispatched almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities in February 1919 to the Western Front and then to the Dardanelles. While in London, Bean had negotiated with the British authorities to take a team of six individuals including the renowned cameraman Hubert Wilkins and the painter George Lambert to collect relics of the fighting for a museum record as well as to photograph the terrain over which the fighting took place and to allow Lambert to do his sketches which later resulted in his celebrated paintings. Having been impressed as a youth from a visit to the Waterloo museum in Belgium by the importance to posterity of preserving relics of historic wars, Bean conceived the idea of the need for a separate Australian war memorial for the preservation of Anzac memorabilia for the historical instruction of the Australian population to be housed in an appropriate building in the planned federal capital. As Bill Gammage perceptively observed in his Foreword to the 1990 edition of *Gallipoli Mission*: "He [Bean] went

¹⁸ Now re-issued as, *Gallipoli Mission* (Sydney, 1990) with a Foreword by Bill Gammage.

back to locate the sites and to answer puzzles about Anzac fighting, some of which had taunted Australians since the day of the Landing, to collect relics for a national war museum, and to report on the condition of allied war graves. In Constantinople he gladly accepted a fourth purpose, to obtain Turkish accounts of the campaign."¹⁹

Gooding's timely publication serves to enlighten posterity even more about the virtually impossible conditions under which the Allies were fighting the determined Turks who were, after all defending their homeland, but as allies of the more dangerous Prusso-Germany military monarchy. On a personal note, some few years ago I met a German professor, Walter Burkert, a renowned historian of classical antiquity, at a conference in Berlin. He had recently visited the Dardanelles and had seen the graves of the Anzacs. On realizing that I was an Australian, he asked in astonishment: "Why in heaven's name were Australians and New Zealanders fighting the Turks?" He obviously did not appreciate that the Turks were fighting under German command. I was able to point out that as Australia and New Zealand were part of the British Empire they were in a *Kriegsverein* pledged to fight off the "Prussian menace" to the entire Empire.²⁰ This is something that critics of the Anzac contribution to the First World War would do well to try to comprehend.

Finally, although Gooding's book is in coffee-table format it is furnished with an extensive critical text that makes clear her understanding that historical records are not solely in the form of written reports or documents. The artifacts of war, the landscape of the theatres of war, the general climatic and geographical conditions are all factors in the drama. Bean in particular appreciated this and clearly was driven to assemble all he could from the deserted battlefield. The photographs of the terrain taken from strategic perspectives, including those from the Turkish angle, provide an immensely rich source in informing the interested reader. Moreover, the paintings of George Lambert stand out as remarkably sensitive and evocative artistic portrayals of the heroic sacrifice of men who in their thousands died fighting in situations of heart-rending hopelessness. Here the young self-governing Dominions were blooded for the still greater sacrifices that were to come on the Western Front. But they were sacrifices not made in vain. The Anzacs stood up to be counted alongside the British, the French and the Indians and were not found wanting as Charles Bean and others since have eloquently written. That this has been a cause for pride among the present-day youth of Australia is not to be wondered at. They come to realise through their annual pilgrimage to Anzac Cove recalling the Anzac achievement that freedom comes at a

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.v.

²⁰ Readers will be familiar with the German word *Zollverein*, "customs union". *Kriegsverein* translates as a union of states pledged to each other's defence against a common enemy, so a "war union". Indeed, German historians, for example, the late Karl-Dietrich Erdmann (1910-1990) in discussion with the present writer used the following formulation in relation to the joint war effort of the former Dominions against Germany, namely that it was the result of *die Bindekraft der Krone*, that is, the "binding force of the crown" referring to the linkage among the various sovereign Commonwealth countries being the crown. It was a perceptive observation because in both world wars the Germans were confronted with Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African troops. See the discussion by Duncan Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations: A Study of its Past and Future* (London, 1920), p.101. Hall adopted the German word *Kriegsverein* to describe the relationship among Commonwealth countries as it was apparently common usage among British civil servants already in the late nineteenth century.

cost. There was and still is no standing aside indifferently when injustice is perpetrated by “rogue states”.²¹

²¹ See Thomas H. Eriksen, “The Rise and Decline of Rogue States”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, 2 (Spring 2001), pp.349-70. As a patriotic citizen of the United States he writes on page 349: “Since time immemorial there have been polities that have stood outside the international community. For centuries, rogue entities have flouted the rules imposed by major states or imperial structures to attain their ends. As in modern times they rose to assault the status quo they then fell either to defeat or to clientage of a stronger power. In the modern context, rogue states show contempt for international norms by repressing their own populations, promoting international terrorism, seeking weapons of mass destruction and standing outside the global community.” Although this definition is more focused on present-day international politics it fits in many respects the behaviour of Wilhelmine Germany. As Stephen Badsey above has observed, the *Mitteleuropa* project of 1914-18 aimed at crushing out of existence numerous ancient polities and their culture to be superseded by the putatively superior Teutonic *Kultur*. In the execution of this aim the Germans resorted to the use of the most destructive tactics and weaponry then scientifically possible: poison gas and unrestricted U-boat warfare. This was justified by the policy of *Schrecklichkeit*, “frightfulness”, carried out ruthlessly against the civilian populations of Belgium and France in the opening weeks of the war when both the cultural heritage of the invaded nations was systematically destroyed and their citizens subjected to ruthless atrocities. See John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven CT, 2001), and Alan Kramer, *Dynamics of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford, 2007).