

Can Kokoda challenge Anzac?

By TOM O’LINCOLN

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Two books got me interested in this topic. One is the collection of essays called *What’s Wrong with Anzac*, put together by Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds. The other is a novel called *Angels of Kokoda*.¹ The novel tells of a friendship between two boys, one Papuan and one Australian, who have a series of improbable adventures against the background of battles on the Kokoda Trail. Not much space is actually devoted to the Papuan carriers – known as the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels – who are presumably where the title came from. This is unfortunate because a more comprehensive portrayal might have brought out more of the unpalatable truth about how they were treated.²

But for today’s discussion, the most interesting aspect is the book’s blithe dismissal of the Anzac tradition. Here are some excerpts from the last two pages of the book. The Australian boy Derek is writing a letter many years later:

I’m not knocking the Greeks at Thermopylae, or the Yanks at the Alamo or even our own Gallipoli ...or any of the things they’ve come to represent, but they don’t rank against the Battle of the Kokoda Track that saved Australia. Not anywhere near. There’s never been anything like those battles. Nowhere. Never...You don’t need to wind me up, Lizzie, I can do it all by myself. Aussie Aussie Aussie Oi Oi Oi.³

This audacious passage made me curious about the strength of anti-Anzac sentiment, and left me wondering if a challenge to the Anzac phenomenon might be launched around the Kokoda tradition – and what were the wider political implications. I went to watch the Melbourne Anzac parade, which convinced me that this commemoration is enjoying perhaps unprecedented strength. The crowds were sizeable and enthusiastic, and every marching band in the state seemed to have turned up. Anzac Day is not going to be challenged as a mass event any time soon. I was still left wondering whether an ideological challenge might emerge on the broad left, and where it might lead. As a starting point we might consider the vulnerabilities of Anzac, which I think remain despite continuing events to “re-invent” it

The Australian left, and the specifically Australian (as opposed to British) nationalists who tend to vote Labor,⁴ have long been hostile to, or at least uncomfortable with Anzac. One important reason is its association with World War I, a war that

so many rightly find repulsive today, as indeed they did at the time. For most people by the war’s end, the industrial scale carnage on the western front seemed to be matched only by the pointlessness of the conflict. Lest we underestimate the left-right schism that tore through Australian society during World War I, consider this oath sworn by the 2,000 members of the Labor Volunteer Army in Broken Hill.

I ... being fully convinced that the conscription of life or labor in Australia will be a death blow to organised Labor and will result in the workers of this land being crushed into subjection by a capitalist military oligarchy, do hereby pledge myself to the working class of Australia that I will not serve as a conscript (industrial or military), and that I will resist by every means in my power any attempt to compel me or any of my comrades in this organisation to break this pledge, even though it may mean my imprisonment or death.⁵

Such was the anti-war working-class radicalism that drove an ALP Prime Minister from the party, and left a tradition which ensured conscription remained controversial in World War II, and even more so in the Vietnam war. The massive 1917 general strike is also part of the context, and strong currents of rebellion against militarism continued in Australia throughout the twenties and thirties. In 1928 a “Class Conscious Digger” wrote to the *Workers’ Weekly* that on Anzac Day, “capitalists, politicians and priests will don their silk hats...and come out and chant about Anzac...to prepare young Australia for another bloody massacre.” In 1931 the Victorian *Labor Call* said the lesson of Anzac Day was “betrayal” of the “great army of workers who go out on some pretext to slay or be slain by another army of workers, said to be in the cause of patriotism.”⁶

Another vulnerability of Anzac has been the aggressive nature of the landing at Anzac Cove. Claims that Australians fought for “freedom” at Gallipoli won’t withstand serious scrutiny, and celebrating the invasion of another country is longer fashionable. Why, denizens of the blogosphere repeatedly asked in 2010, had Australia invaded the Ottoman Empire?⁷ By contrast the public perception has been that the 1942 battles in Papua were defensive.

The latter view motivates a semi-fictional Brigadier Ken Eather, who appears briefly in *Angels of Kokoda* at his most famous hour. Having argued to move his troops back to Imita Ridge, Eather was told there could be no further retreats; the Australians must triumph or die because “if the Japanese take Moresby, there is nothing to prevent the invasion of

Australia".⁸ Bob Wurth similarly writes: "If Moresby fell, it was not hard to see that mainland Australia could follow."⁹ Once again it is the battle that saves Australia. Paul Keating saw it that way too. Keating was the first major public figure to make a serious attempt to replace Anzac with Kokoda in the public imagination. In his 1992 Port Moresby speech he was respectful towards Anzac, but argued that it was out of date:

The Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died not in defence of the old world, but the new world...They died in defence of Australia, and the civilisation and values which had grown up there. That is why it might be said that, for Australians, the battles in Papua New Guinea were the most important ever fought.¹⁰

He was more aggressive later at a book launch, described by Bob Ellis:

"I have never gone to Gallipoli," Keating said, "and I never will. Kokoda is more my speed. There we fought, and won, a long battle that made a difference to our nation's future. That saved us from something, as Gallipoli never did."¹¹

Keating had limited success in his attempts to recast Australian nationalism, but it isn't hard to imagine some future populist Prime Minister taking it further, particularly if a war is brewing.

Another weakness is Anzac's association with the British. There has long been a tension between British empire nationalism and specifically Australian nationalism, with the fault lines associated in fairly obvious ways with sections of the population, for example between those of English and Irish descent. The labour movement tended to embrace Australian nationalism, while Tories tended to embrace the British side. When I first heard of Anzac Day after arriving in Australia, critics told me it was a bloody disaster caused by incompetent British generals. Blaming it on the Brits has no attraction for me, but we should note this sentiment as a fact.

As indicated by the quotes from "Class Conscious Digger" and the *Labor Call*, there have also been some who would have nothing to do with nationalism. We don't always appreciate the importance of the internationalist strand in both the working class and the intelligentsia after the horrors of the war. Labour historian Ian Turner remarked that many politically radical people in the 1930s believed "the worker had no fatherland, patriotism was the last refuge of the munitions-maker ... all men were brothers, and nationalism stood on the lunatic fringe..."¹² Turner's background was in the Communist Party, which originally adopted the philosophy expressed in the Communist Manifesto – the workers have no country, workers of all countries unite. By the same logic they rejected the coming war as an imperialist venture.

Such views had a following among workers well beyond party ranks. Consider Alan Walker's wartime survey of Cessnock. He asked 184 men if the European conflict was just another capitalistic war, to which 26 replied 'probably' and 49 said, 'of course it is'. Given that 41 percent saw the conflict as an 'economic or imperialistic clash', Walker concluded that pro-war propaganda had fallen flat.¹³

They were still minority views, but minorities can acquire wider influence in a time of crisis. The years 1939-42 represented the interface of two crises, the first being the 1930s depression, which had artificially reduced the social power of organized labour and with it, the political left. When that situation began to turn around with the advent of the second crisis, war – in particular, as trade unionists' bargaining power began to rise – the pent up social forces burst out in strikes. This fact finds its way into *Angels of Kokoda*, in a complaint about the "bloody Commo wharfies" who take industrial action in wartime.¹⁴

Before mid-1940 the basis was there for significant working class struggle, whether explicitly or only implicitly anti-war resistance to World War II, but the way the war unfolded turned all this around.

After Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, most of the left embraced the war effort. It was an unprecedented degree of collaboration with the capitalist state. Then came the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and the apparent threat of invasion. For the first time there was real mass support for the war, and the majority of the left were enthusiastic. At the height of the war, the Communists had up to 4,000 organised members in the military, and were able to hold a delegated conference representing them with 50 delegates from across North Queensland.¹⁵ Their total membership at a claimed 23,000 reached unprecedented levels. In addition they became, along with ALP leaders, arbiters of how the war effort unfolded. The unpatriotic "commos" became the "leading war party" and the Communists set pro-war agendas for the Australian left generally in the period from 1942 to 1945.¹⁶

Most of the 15,000 or so "war-Communists" left the party once the Cold War made the former Soviet ally unfashionable, and most of those departing turned their backs on its general political line. But the war experience was one sphere where ex-Communists could be comfortable with their party's role without inviting cold-war ostracism. It merged into a more general culture of what I call left nationalism, a culture whose representatives include Nettie and Vance Palmer, Russell Ward, Ian Turner, and more recently Phillip Adams, John Pilger, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds.

The forces of the left nationalists were renewed during the Vietnam War. When called unpatriotic by supporters of the war, the anti-war movement could

respond on the basis of two ideological traditions. One was the legacy of those leftist movements which believed in an international class struggle and saw the Australian state as part of the despised imperialist forces. Those who subscribed to such views were few in numbers, though sometimes important in providing organizers and activists.

Much more important in terms of popular sentiment, however was the left nationalist point of view, clearly expressed during the 1970s moratorium. This centered on the accusation that foreign powers were dragging Australia into war. A Brisbane leaflet charged that “We are fighting for the sake of American imperialism. Our diggers die for dollars”, Labor Senate leader Murphy said “We are involved because the US Government decided we should be involved”, while the Sydney Trade Union Moratorium Committee argued that “the powerful and enormously rich families who own American monopolies see to it by lobbying, bribery and corruption that the war in Vietnam continues and escalates to the extent that they secure the maximum in profits from war contracts.”¹⁷

The argument seems to fit virtually every military adventure in the history of white Australia. Did not Britain drag Australia into the Sudan conflict, the Boer War, World War I and the Malayan emergency? Did not America drag us into Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan? The great exception seems to be World War II – apparently this was the one and only time Australians fought for their own state. Baby boomer radicals who absorbed this basic line of argument in the period 1967-75 retained much of it for life, and it is a standard viewpoint in the labour movement.

I disagree with it, and have long argued that the Australian state aggressively pursues its own interests. Taking Vietnam for example, there is evidence that at crucial turning points the Australian Chiefs of Staff sought to drag Lyndon Johnson and the Americans deeper into the war. Canberra was keen to keep them as deeply committed as possible to Asia, so that if needs be they could back up Australia’s own interests against rivals from the north.¹⁸

But my view is that of a small minority. Left nationalism is far stronger, a fact that helps us understand a curious gap in *The Trouble With Anzac*, one that Geoffrey Blainey points out. The authors “concentrate on those wars that suit their pacifist and peace-march assumptions” while “World War II is neatly skipped over...”¹⁹ Which is regrettable since much of their general analysis applies. For example the fact that the Kokoda Trail, like Anzac Cove, has become a tourist attraction.²⁰ But no substantial critique was offered, probably because World War II, and Kokoda, are acceptable to Australian left nationalism.

The nationalist left does tend to share some traditional complaints about great-power manipulation, such as Churchill’s resistance to sending Australian troops home, but for the most part the Australian sections of the Pacific War are seen as one great conflict Australia should lay claim to. It seems obvious that to the extent there is an alternative to Anzac, it must cohere around Kokoda. But isn’t the 25th of April an unchallengeable date of commemoration? How flexible is the calendar?

Evolving commemorations

As Humphrey McQueen relates, celebrations of the Coral Sea Battle in May were initially promoted by the Australian – American Association. This Association had been formed in the 1930s to combat isolationism in the US, which also meant attempting to keep the US engaged in Asia – and therefore, implicitly, more inclined to provide back-up to Australia’s own regional interests. The Association promoted the Coral Sea commemorations as having “saved Australia from becoming one of the bloody ravaged battlefields of the war”, a claim which would later be echoed in claims that the fighting in Papua had saved Australia.

As for political backing, in the late 1940s the Chifley Government showed little interest, but commemorations reached a high point in the 1950s under Liberal Governments, who wished to promote the US alliance as part of the Cold War. This continued into the Vietnam War era, when Defence Minister Allen Fairhall encouraged his colleagues to hope people wouldn’t “throw away the value of the US alliance when they recall the Coral Sea Battle”²¹. But they did discount it, and while the US alliance is generally accepted today, the public discourse about Iraq and Afghanistan suggests it’s not particularly liked.

Anzac Day by contrast has flourished, but at the expense of another, seemingly well-established commemoration. Mark McKenna chronicles the decline of Australia Day which had apparently reached a peak height in 1988. In the run-up to the bicentenary of the first fleet, substantial government funding was directed to building patriotic feeling for this “celebration of a nation”. Yet public interest was flat as a tack. “What does it celebrate?” wondered Vernon Wilkes, former Victorian attorney-general. “I wonder how many people know that it relates to Governor Phillip and Sydney Cove...”²² As the celebration approached, however, it became clear that a greater embarrassment was in store with the whole world watching.

There was no hiding the fact that Indigenous people didn’t celebrate these events at all, and would in fact be mobilising demonstrations. The name “Invasion Day” attached itself to 26 January and could not be shaken off. The *Sydney Morning Herald*

recognised that “barely a day” passed without the voices of indigenous people and their supporters challenging the national festival of self-congratulation.²³

This embarrassment opened up a space for Anzac Day to become Australia’s unofficial national day. The calendar seems to be malleable.

Self-defence or defence of freedom?

One more vulnerability of Anzac remains for us to consider. A major advantage the tradition of the Papuan campaign enjoys is the perceived defensive character of the Pacific war effort. In modern thinking a just war must be waged in self-defence. And that is definitively an advance, but it does not resolve everything. This is a theme of *Angels of Kokoda*, but in an undeveloped form. The Australian boy Derek remarks: “It’s no use saying we shouldn’t fight...we didn’t start this war, the bloody Japs did.”²⁴ But we can’t mechanically equate “who started it” with who is at fault. As Blainey points out: “There can be no doubt that the Japanese started the war. Whether they alone caused the war is extremely open to doubt. We forget that Japan had been pushed into a corner.”²⁵

Blainey is backed up by the views of Weary Dunlop who felt the Japanese “had an excuse for getting involved in the last war. I think that the Americans put them down as a tin-pot economy, and really screwed them down as a minor power. There was a lot of provocation”.²⁶ I don’t share Dunlop’s sentiments; we should never make excuses for imperialism. But he and Blainey remind us that “they started it” only in the most simplistic sense. The problem becomes more acute if we recall that in East Timor it was the Australian “Sparrow Force” that initiated hostilities.²⁷

There can be justified grounds to strike first. But the core of the argument here is that the fighting at Kokoda and elsewhere was *defensive* on Australia’s part. This is the semi-fictionalised Ken Eather’s assumption at Imita Ridge: if the Japanese take Port Moresby, nothing can prevent the invasion of Australia.

But is it true? Peter Stanley argues that it’s not. He says key decision makers in Japan had recognised that invading Australia, apart from raids, was beyond their grasp. Here the author of *Angels of Kokoda* treads carefully. “The Japanese General knew his troops were in a bad way,” says Derek of the terrain near Imita Ridge, and so he retreated. But – important but – had he realised how badly off the Australians were, he might still have captured Imita Ridge.²⁸ We will never know but the real issue is not whether the shattered Japanese could have gone another small step, but whether they could have projected power at least as far as, say, Brisbane.

The argument seems to be winning out among professional historians that there was no realistic invasion threat. Be that as it may, we don’t have time to argue it here. I will refer you to my research note on the subject. I’m more interested in the consequences of this breakthrough. Stanley’s view has aroused sharp responses. One well known critic is Bob Wurth, who has written some interesting material, unfortunately alongside foolish attacks on the “growing danger of revisionism” (meaning Stanley).²⁹ The following excerpt from Wurth’s reply to my review of the book will perhaps convey the gist of his position.

Is it wrong for me to say that the Japanese in 1942 were on an “inexorable march south”? Of course it isn’t. Is it wrong to say Australia, an ‘almost defenceless nation’, had been left high and dry? No, it certainly is not. Tom should read the 1942 comments of Australian generals ... just for starters.³⁰

What I find interesting upon re-reading this exchange is not that we disagree on the facts. If that were the matter we could resolve it by checking facts. But here is one crucial passage from Wurth’s 1942 book:

The weight of evidence is that there were various Japanese plans...to invade Australia. Yet it is not suggested that a final planning order for an invasion of Australia ever reached the approval stage, or that imperial General Headquarters ever agreed with such an action.³¹

This sentence brings Wurth and me surprisingly close on the facts. In his reply to me, he points to the irrationality of key Japanese naval officers, and asks what if they had prevailed in the Japanese debates. He thinks landings in the north would have been “relatively easy” but is aware of “the obvious longer-term consequences.” Well I don’t dispute the Japanese might have launched some crazy adventure. War is by nature a journey into madness. But in practice the differences remain, because Wurth belongs to a different ideological world.

Another representative of that world is Peter Grose. In his book *An Awkward Truth*, about the bombing of Darwin, Grose remarks: “There is a noisy orthodoxy that says the Japanese never had any intention of invading Australia ...” Isn’t that a magnificent phrase: noisy orthodoxy! “These historians are, of course, correct,” he adds, but it was “closer run than many historians care to admit.”³² Again the facts are clear, yet there remains a kind of tribal loyalty impelling some historians to begrudge them. .

We do *seem* to have agreement that Japan was incapable of invading and subjugating Australia, and that Japanese leaders did on balance recognise this fact. I think this is enough to pose some challenges to the alternative militarist tradition built around the Pacific War.

The Pacific War tradition is seen as defensive. But if there was no realistic threat from Japan, how defensive was the war? And just what were the troops in Papua and New Guinea defending? Former Prime Minister Billy Hughes was frank enough in 1945, saying the Aussies “are not fighting to hand over New Guinea to some international trusteeship, but to retain it for the Australian Government.”³³ Peter Grose focuses on the only actual attacks on Australia of any consequence: the bombing of Darwin. But even this is open to objection: actually these bombings were intended to eliminate Allied air cover from areas further north, such as East Timor. And by the way, what exactly were we defending in East Timor?

The argument that Australia faced an invasion is sometimes based on the view that Papua and New Guinea were “Australian territory”. This view must confront two difficulties. The first is captured in John Curtin’s unambiguous statement to journalists at his “backroom briefings” that “New Guinea wasn’t Australia. It was only a place of military strategy...”³⁴ The other is the fact that, since some local people appear to have supported the Japanese, “defending Papua” may have meant denying their right to self-determination. We might ask similar questions about East Timor.

If the war wasn’t defensive, what was it about? Stanley wants to return to an earlier narrative, in which the war isn’t all about Australia – a narrative in which Australia fought Japan because the Axis were global oppressors, and the Japanese were regional oppressors. John Curtin made this argument on 9 December 1941: that Australia must fight because “our vital interests are imperilled and because the rights of free people in the whole Pacific are assailed.”³⁵ But this is hypocrisy – for how many people in the Asia-Pacific were free?

The Philippines had been forcibly colonised by the USA in a brutal war; Papua New Guinea was effectively an Australian colony, Indonesia had experienced cruel overlordship by the Dutch, Singapore and Malaya were British colonies, and Indochina was ruthlessly held by the French. At the end of the war these powers returned to reassert their control in one form or another and in most cases it took a struggle to force them out. I pursue these themes in *Australia’s Pacific War*.

But if the war wasn’t about defending Australia, nor about defending freedom, what is left? The war is revealed as the imperialist exercise the 1930s leftists had feared. Continuing support for the war effort in the Pacific then relies, in my experience, on judgements that the Japanese “were even worse”. That may be so, but it’s subjective – and what shall be the measure? Thus the arguments over the Pacific War reveal potential cracks in the ideological construct that is Kokoda.

Nevertheless Kokoda is likely to attract support in future because of the continuing influence of left nationalism. Imagine a major war – which is alas all too easy given the growing tensions with China. The Australian state would inevitably attempt to win over, or at least neutralise sources of opposition to the war effort; and judging by the experience of recent decades, left nationalism is the most likely source of opposition. The militarist tradition most likely to attract them is Kokoda, not Anzac. The standard concern of left nationalists – that foreign imperialists drag us into war – will always weigh down the Anzac tradition.

Kokoda has so far escaped most accusations of imperialism, but that is beginning to change. Expectations that writing a book arguing such a view was asking for trouble have proved mistaken. My experience is that many readers are ready for such an argument, and some are pleased to finally hear it. Seventy years after Kokoda, this is not before time. Three years before the hundredth anniversary of Gallipoli, it’s time to prepare for debates, in which opportunities may arise to challenge militarist hegemony. Understanding Kokoda as a militarist and nationalist icon will help us make the most of them.

¹ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds (eds) *What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010. David Mulligan, *Angels of Kokoda*, Lothian, Melbourne, 2006.

² The Papuan carriers were basically forced labour. See John Waiko. *A Short History of Papua New Guinea*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1993, p 114; Paul Byrne, “A Track Winding Back”, *The Good Weekend*, 25 February, 2006. Note *Angels of Kokoda* contains more than one mention of “unreliable natives”, an oblique acknowledgement that some Papuans didn’t support the allies. Not that this should be a revelation. David Dexter’s official war history says the local people in New Guinea considered it “prudent to serve Japanese or Australians, whichever happened to control the areas in which they lived.” He adds that many locals “served the Japanese with their hands and the Australians with their hearts”, but offers no evidence for the latter point, so it may be a consoling fiction. The locals in Portuguese-ruled East Timor were sometimes “unreliable” too. Australia’s Timorese incursion was, of course, an unprovoked invasion; the Japanese wanted to preserve Portuguese neutrality and preferred to stay out.

³ David Mulligan, *Angels of Kokoda*, p. 206-207. The Australian boy Derek’s indifference to the fate of Japanese dead is another disappointing aspect. Yes it is realistic, but it also appears to express the author’s view.

⁴ For a discussion see the introduction to Luke Trainer, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late 19th Century*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994 .

⁵ Quoted in Paul Adams, *The Best Hated Man in Australia. The Life and Death of Percy Brookfield 1875-1921*, Puncher & Wattmann, Glebe, 2010, p. 56.

⁶ Quoted in Kyla Cassell, “Politics and Meaning: Melbourne’s Eight Hours Day and Anzac Day, 1928-

1935”, *Marxist Interventions* no 2, 2010, <http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/mi/2/mi2cassells.pdf>

⁷ Blogger JLT quoted in Lake and Reynolds, p. 10; I also recall such comments.

⁸ David Mulligan, *Angels of Kokoda*, p. 152. This appears to be a fictionalised wording, but is consistent with the history, on which see Steve Eather, *Desert Sands, Jungle Lands: A Biography of Major-General Ken Eather*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003, p. 75.

⁹ Wurth, 1942, p. 199

¹⁰ Quoted in Mark Ryan, *Advancing Australia: The Speeches of Paul Keating, Prime Minister*, Sydney, Big Picture, 1995, p. 280.

¹¹ Quoted in Bob Ellis, ‘Battles Lost, Minds Won’, *The Drum*, <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2879215.htm>

¹² Ian Turner, *Room For Manoeuvre: Writings on History, Politics, Ideas and Play*, Drummond, Melbourne, 1982, p. 26.

¹³ Alan Walker, *Coaltown: A Social Survey of Cessnock NSW*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1945, p. 88.

¹⁴ Mulligan, *Angels of Kokoda*, p. 200.

¹⁵ Beverly Symons, “All Out for the People’s War, Communist Soldiers in the Australian Army in the Second World War”, *Historical Studies* 26 (105), October 1995.

¹⁶ Tom O’Lincoln, “Fatal Compromises: The Australian Communists and World War II,” <http://redsites.alphalink.com.au/cpaww2.htm>

¹⁷ Quoted in Rick Kuhn, “The Australian Left, Nationalism and the Vietnam War” www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/interventions/lvframe.htm

¹⁸ Gregory Pemberton offers evidence that at crucial turning points, the Australian Chiefs of Staff exerted themselves to drag Lyndon Johnson and the Americans deeper into the war. Canberra was keen to keep them committed to Asia, so that they could back up Australia’s own interests against rivals from the north. See Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, ch 9; and Tom O’Lincoln, “The Neighbour From Hell: Australian Imperialism” in Rick Kuhn (ed) *Class and Struggle in Australia*, Pearson Longmann, 2005, ch 10.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Blainey, “We Weren’t So Dumb”, *The Australian*, 7 April 2010. .

²⁰ Though Kokoda has some catching up to do: “Today the Gallipoli industry is big business, with the centenary threatening to become a bunfight. I was so embarrassed by on-field drinking, revelry and cavorting around the war graves at the 90th anniversary dawn service, I took my tour group home early.” Jonathan King, “Look Beyond Gallipoli”, *The Age*, 11 November 2011, p. 15. The closest I’ve come to a Kokoda tourist experience is climbing the scale model of the trail at Lilydale outside Melbourne.

²¹ Humphrey McQueen, *Japan to the Rescue, Australian Security Around the Indonesian Archipelago During the American Century*, Viking, Melbourne, 1991, p. 289 ff.

²² Mark McKenna, “Anzac Day: How Did it Become Australia’s National Day?” in Lake, Reynolds et al, *What’s Wrong with Anzac?*, p. 113.

²³ Quoted in Lake & Reynolds, p. 115.

²⁴ Mulligan, *Angels of Kokoda*, p. 150.

²⁵ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Blainey View*, ABC, Sydney, 1982, p. 104.

²⁶ Edward Dunlop, “Reflections, 1946 and 1992”, in Gavin McCormack and Hank Nelson (eds), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, p. 148

²⁷ Henry Frei “Japan’s Reluctant Decision to Occupy Portuguese Timor,” *Australian Historical Studies*, 27 (107), October 1996. See also Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, AWM, Canberra, 1957, p. 469-470. and O’Lincoln, *Australia’s Pacific War*, pp. 27-30.

²⁸ Ibid, p 160.

²⁹ <http://john.curtin.edu.au/events/speeches/wurth.html>

³⁰ Bob Wurth, “Muddled Facts”, *Overland*, No 194, Autumn 2009, p. 4.

³¹ Bob Wurth, *1942: Australia’s Greatest Peril*, MacMillan, Sydney, p. 357.

³² Peter Grose, *An Awkward Truth: The Bombing of Darwin February 1942*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney p. 63.

³³ “New Guinea ‘Part of Australia?’”, *The Argus*, 17 March 1945, p. 3.

³⁴ Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall, *Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s War*, National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1997, p. 98.

³⁵ Peter Stanley, *Invading Australia: Japan and the Battle for Australia*, 1942, Viking, Melbourne, 2008. The title is presumably ironic, as Stanley argues there was no invasion risk nor any “Battle for Australia”.

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